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Exploring the potential transition from strategic technology partnering to mergers
and acquisitions
This paper studies a number of research topics derived from the basic question: do inter-
firm partnerships with different intermediary modes of company organization change over
time as companies that were previously cooperating become integrated? The analysis is
limited to the group of strategic technology alliances, i.e. those inter-firm agreements for
which joint technology development or technology sharing is part of the agreement.
The paper first explores the literature that refers to the possible transition from
strategic technology alliances to mergers and acquisitions. Based on this we formulate a
number of hypotheses regarding the change in modes of governance and several
dimensions of this process related to the size of firms, the international distribution, the
distribution of contractual and equity agreements and the industry specificity. The major
finding of our research is that the transformation from strategic technology alliance to
merger and acquisition hardly ever takes place. This suggests that alliances and mergers
and acquisitions are not part of a rather smooth continuum but they are first of all
different modes of governance where one mode certainly does not lead to the other.
1INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the transformation of strategic technology alliances into mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) in the context of the well-known continuum that reaches from
market transactions via the 'swollen middle' of hybrid modes of governance to integrated
hierarchical structures (Hennart, 1993 and Williamson, 1991). Most of the research on
these alternative modes of organization has concentrated on economic or strategic
implications for firms regarding each of the segments of the continuum or the trade off
in the choice between these alternatives. So far little empirical research has been
performed that concerns the possible transition of different modes of company
organization, e.g. the possible dynamic relationship between intermediary modes and
hierarchies.
A small number of contributions, in particular in the strategic management
literature, links up to the intuitive understanding of such a relationship stressing an
'encroachment' strategy followed by some companies. For instance Doz, Hamel and
Prahalad (1986), Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Reich and Mankin (1984) analyze
such strategies in the context of firms that use their alliances as a vehicle to get greater
control over their partners, whereby some of these partners are integrated after a period
of 'courtship'. However, if we study the vast body of literature on strategic alliances,
cooperative agreements and joint ventures that has emerged parallel to the rapid increase
of these inter-firm agreements, we find only a limited number of examples where the
encroachment thesis is empirically tested or theoretically further developed.
In the following we pay attention to a set of research questions related to the basic
2question: do inter-firm partnerships with different intermediary modes of organization,
such as contractual agreements and equity sharing agreements, change over time as
companies, that were previously cooperating, become integrated? This question addresses
the rather 'strong' variant in the transformation process where companies are merged or
taken over instead of a transformation of an equity agreement in which one of the partners
increases its share in the equity distribution of an alliance. Although equity agreements
are still an important vehicle for inter-firm partnering, it has to be stressed that the
majority of cooperative agreements made in recent years have become of a contractual
nature. It is estimated that in the late eighties and early nineties about 75% of the strategic
alliances are of a contractual nature without equity-sharing (Hagedoorn, 1996). Given this
growing importance of contractual agreements  it appears more interesting to study the
possible transformation of alliances through an encroachment of partners than to
concentrate on the 'weaker' variant, i.e. the increase of an equity-share within a joint
venture.
Following the above-mentioned continuum our paper concentrates on the
cooperation - integration related aspects of inter-firm relationships. More specifically we
distinguish four different modes:
- contractual agreements, in particular joint R&D pacts and joint development
agreements through which companies undertake innovative projects with shared
resources 
- joint ventures are combinations of the economic interests of at least two different
companies in a 'distinct' firm which also performs R&D or undertakes innovative
3projects
- takeovers or acquisitions where one company has obtained majority ownership
over another company
- mergers refer to cases where two separate companies are combined into one
company.
The first two modes are strategic alliances (Hagedoorn, 1993), the latter two are
hierarchies in the classical sense of being modes of governance that are integrated into
one company.
The above already indicates that we limit the group of strategic alliances to
technology related partnerships, i.e. those inter-firm agreements for which joint
technology development or technology sharing are part of the agreement. Although this
has some obvious limitations, previous research, for instance Kogut (1991), mentions the
particular role that technology related alliances can play in  possible takeover activities.
In that context a strategic alliance is applied by at least one of the partners to assess the
strategic importance of the technology involved. After the decision to invest in a
particular technology is delayed for some time or only partially made in order to assess
the importance of that technology, the company decides whether it intends to increase its
activities through an acquisition of the alliance or its partner. Furthermore, the particular
strategic importance of technology for the future competitive strength of companies is a
major reason why technology related alliances are an interesting subset of a wider range
of cooperative agreements (Mowery, 1988; Mytelka, 1991).
In the following sections we will first explore the scattered pieces of literature that
4refer to the possible transition from strategic technology alliances to M&As. Based on our
understanding of the most crucial and relevant contributions we will formulate a number
of hypotheses regarding the change from alliances into M&As in the light of several
dimensions of this transformation such as the size of firms, the international distribution,
the distribution of equity versus contractual modes, and the industry specificity. Due to
the exploratory character of our investigation and the rather remarkable empirical finding
regarding the actual significance of the encroachment strategy we will not attempt to first
formulate an elaborate theoretical foundation. However, theoretical implications of our
contribution will be discussed in the final section of the paper. Before we test several
hypotheses we will pay attention to the data sets that are analyzed, the procedures used
to link different data banks, and the description of the indicators as applied in this study.
Finally, our conclusions set our contribution against the current understanding of different
modes of governance and the particular place taken by strategic technology alliances. We
will briefly discuss our main findings in terms of possible consequences for a theoretical
understanding of strategic technology alliances as a distinct mode of organization.
EXPLORING THE CONTINUUM: PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
Strategic alliances leading to M&As
As already mentioned above Doz, Hamel and Prahalad (1986) and Reich and Mankin
(1984) mention that firms can use their strategic alliances to learn about the opportunity
to achieve greater control over their partner in an acquisition. Kogut (1991) analyzes joint
ventures, which we understand as a particular group of strategic alliances, as an option
5for firms that can bridge two basic alternatives, i.e. to wait before one commits resources
and to demonstrate strong commitment through investment. Joint ventures are then used
to asses the opportunity of a new technology or new product. After the chances of future
success have become more clear the option to acquire is likely to be exercised. Bowman
and Hurry (1993) apply the idea of the ‘option lens’ to discuss the sequential choice in
incremental options that allow companies to make a small investment, e.g. in a joint
venture, and then to postpone for some time a more definite decision that would imply the
striking of an option, e.g. through an acquisition. In a somewhat similar line of thought
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) point at the possibilities offered by alliances to
investigate takeover opportunities and to first encroach a partner before it is acquired.
These authors conclude that “... in many cases collaboration is the first productive step
(...) before complete acquisition, or to overcome a firm’s reticence and open the way for
a potential merger” (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, p. 246). Also Hurry (1993) and
Lynch (1989) point at the general advantages of incremental strategies through which,
over time, cooperation leads to the acquisition of partners. Firms that are active in
forming partnerships are expected to create alliances to learn about new opportunities or
to use alliances as vehicles for acquisitions or divesture. Following this line of inquiry,
which points at the potential  acquisition of one of the partners in an alliance, we
introduce the following hypothesis:
1 Strategic technology alliances lead to the formation of M&As, whereby
6participating companies are taken over or merged and the strategic technology
alliance is transformed from shared to single ownership.
Our reading of the literature suggests that very little is known on the actual time-
lag between establishing a strategic alliance or a joint venture and its possible acquisition.
Kogut's (1988) study of nearly 150 joint ventures involving US firms shows that very few
of them were acquired during the first year, during the following years about 25% of the
joint ventures were acquired. Given this degree of ignorance regarding possible time-lags,
we will not formulate a hypothesis on this topic but keep it as a question as to what time-
lag can be reconstructed for strategic technology alliances that lead to M&As.
General conditions affecting the process of transformation 
Most of the studies mentioned above understand strategic alliances in the context of a
number of conditions that shape the outcome of partnering strategies. Ring and van de
Ven (1992) discuss important dimensions that have to be taken into account such as
market power differentials, domestic and international aspects, relational characteristics
such as the mode of cooperation, and the industry specific context of partnering
behaviour. In the following we will discuss the possible transition of strategic technology
alliances in the light of each of these dimensions of partnering strategies.
Market power and size of firms 
7The analysis of the role that companies of different size classes might play in the
transition of strategic technology alliances fits quite well within the more or less standard
industrial organization inspired tradition within strategic management where the different
roles of companies from different size categories is frequently explored further. In that
context Hurry (1993) places part of his analysis of strategic partnering strategies in the
context of the relationship between financially stronger and weaker firms. He expects
stronger firms to take control over their alliances or acquire their weaker partners.
Research by Berg, et al (1982), Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) and Duysters and
Hagedoorn (1995) suggests that larger firms are more active in partnering than their
smaller competitors. The first mentioned contribution also hints at the possibility that in
case of an unequal size distribution in a partnership, this alliance will probably be
dissolved through a takeover. Taken together with the already mentioned encroachment
thesis, we can interpret the relationship between size of companies and the transformation
of strategic technology alliances in terms of a relationship between unequals, suggesting
that:
2a If the transformation from strategic technology alliances to M&As occurs, a
disproportionate share of these cases of transformation is between companies of
different size-classes.
2b After a period of courtship through strategic technology alliances, large firms
acquire their smaller partners.
8Domestic versus international partnerships  
Several recent contributions suggest that the domestic or international character of an
alliance influences the particular organizational mode being chosen. Research by Gulati
(1995) and Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) indicates that international alliances are more
equity oriented whereas a disproportionate share of domestic alliances are of a contractual
nature. From both a transaction cost economics perspective and a strategic management
perspective this preference can be explained in terms of the cost of monitoring and
keeping control over a long distance agreement. As domestic alliances are formed in a
familiar environment, equity control is probably less prevalent in order to monitor the
agreement than in the case of international alliances, where the familiarity with the
behaviour of partners is expected to be smaller. Enforcing a contract in an unfamiliar
environment is rather difficult compared to enforcing partial control through an alliance
in which equity-sharing gives a firm at least some degree of ownership advantages
(Dunning, 1993). An interesting question in that context is then whether the
disproportionate equity orientation of international strategic technology alliances also
implies that firms demonstrate a certain preference for increasing their control over their
international partnerships through integration. Research by Longfellow Blodgett (1991)
does suggest that international strategic technology alliances have a high chance of being
discontinued through the acquisition of one of the partners in the alliance. Hence:
3 If the transformation from strategic technology alliances to M&As occurs, the
9share of these M&As will be disproportionately higher for international strategic
technology alliances than for domestic strategic technology  alliances.
Differences between equity and non-equity-based agreements
The literature on strategic alliances and inter-firm cooperation suggests that different
modes of cooperation, such as equity-sharing alliances (joint ventures) and contractual
modes have a different impact on performance, organization, and management of
partnering firms (Hagedoorn, 1993; Harrigan, 1985; Osborn and Baughn, 1990).
Hagedoorn (1993) found joint ventures aimed at shared innovative efforts to be rather
complex organizations with a multitude of company objectives, whereas contractual
modes of technology partnering are more one-dimensionally oriented. The complexity of
joint ventures seems to make these organizations vulnerable and prone to failure (Berg
et al., 1982). Contractual technology partnering agreements, on the contrary, are more
limited in scope, aimed at short-term technological achievement and fairly simple in terms
of their organizational nature. Although there is, to the best of our knowledge, no
literature analyzing the different options to acquire partners through contracts or joint
ventures, we expect the likelihood of the creation of M&As through joint ventures to be
higher than through contractual agreements. We already mentioned that research by
Kogut (1991), Berg et al. (1982) and Longfellow Blodgett (1991) indicates that joint
ventures can be part of a  take over process. The multidimensional nature of joint ventures
provides partners with a better understanding of the technological and commercial impact
of the venture. Compared to joint ventures contractual agreements have a more limited
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scope and are aimed at single projects that seem of much less relevance to a future
takeover or merger activity which concerns a wider range of company activities.
Therefore, we expect that joint ventures have a higher probability of leading to an M&A
than contractual agreements. Hence:
4 If the transformation from strategic technology alliances to M&As occurs, a
disproportionate share of strategic technology alliances that are of an equity
nature (joint ventures) will lead to an M&A transformation, whereas a
disproportionate share of strategic technology alliances of a contractual nature
will not be dissolved in M&As.
Industry context
Contributions by Harrigan and Newman (1990) and Balakrishna and Koza (1993) suggest
that joint ventures between companies from similar businesses have a higher probability
of being dissolved than those made between companies from dissimilar industries.
Hagedoorn (1993) discusses the importance of technological and market complementarity
for understanding the motives of partners to engage in strategic technology alliances.
Harrigan (1985), Mowery (1988) and Ohmae (1985) also indicate that complementarity
is an essential characteristic for successfully maintaining a strategic alliance. This
suggests that complementarity of partners, that are operating in dissimilar product-
markets with probably little conflict of interests, increases the viability of the combined
effort, whereas cooperation between companies with similar product-market combinations
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and a higher probability of a conflict of interests is more likely to be resolved in an M&A.
Therefore:
5 If the transformation from strategic technology alliances to M&As occurs, a
disproportionate share of  strategic technology alliances between companies from
the same industry will lead to an M&A transformation, whereas a
disproportionate share of  strategic technology alliances between companies from
different sectors will not be transformed into M&As.
A number of studies reveals that the level of technological sophistication of sectors
of industry affects the distribution of equity or non-equity modes of strategic technology
partnering. According to Harrigan (1985 and 1988) rapid technological change in sectors
of industry induces the formation of somewhat informal forms of cooperation such as
non-equity agreements. As industries become mature, more formal modes of cooperations
such as joint ventures become the preferred form of collaboration. Osborn and Baughn
(1990) suggest that technological instability of industrial sectors is a crucial factor in
explaining different patterns for equity and non-equity partnerships. R&D intensive
sectors with short product-life cycles and an innovative industrial climate are expected
to demand more organizational flexibility leading to a general preference for contractual
agreements. In sectors with low degrees of R&D intensity and little innovative turbulence
where organizational flexibility is also less crucial, technology partnering agreements is
expected to be dominated by joint ventures. Yu and Tang's (1992) findings can be
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interpreted along similar lines: stable sectoral environments favour joint venture
formation, uncertain environments will lead to a larger number of non-equity agreements.
Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) also found that technology-intensive sectors are
characterized by a vast majority of contractual agreements, whereas the formation of joint
ventures accounts for a disproportionate share of technology partnering in medium and
low-tech industries. This preference for contractual agreements in technologically
advanced sectors and equity oriented cooperation in other sectors suggests that the
transformation of strategic technology alliances into M&As could also be unevenly
distributed. Turbulent environments would demand in particular short-term contractual
agreements with little need for integration of these partners,  in other sectors where equity
agreements are already more visible the step from an equity agreement to an M&A would
be more likely. This line of reasoning follows Oster (1992) who suggests that high-tech
industries, characterized by risk and flexibility, favour strategic alliances to M&As,
whereas M&As are expected to be more popular in mature sectors. In the present
contribution, we analyze this relationship between mode of cooperation and the degree
of technological change in sectors with particular reference to new core technologies,
such as biotechnology, new materials and information technologies. Following van Tulder
and Junne (1988) we expect these new core technologies to present a turbulent high-tech
environment  demanding new technological competences from companies competing in
these fields. Hence:
6 If the transformation from strategic technology alliances to M&As occurs, the
13
share of these transformed strategic technology alliances in new core technologies
is disproportionately smaller than the share of the transformed strategic
technology alliances in other sectors or fields of technology.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to find out to what extent strategic technology alliances lead to M&As we
combined data from two sources, the MERIT-CATI data bank on strategic technology
alliances and the Securities Data data set on M&As. The MERIT-CATI data bank
contains data on nearly 13.000 cooperative technology agreements involving about 5.000
parent companies. The information is stored in the form of a relational database whereby
its separate data files can be linked to each other in order to provide data in a
(dis)aggregate and combined form. Since 1987 data on inter-firm alliances has been
systematically collected, including a retrospective search, and the database currently
covers the period between 1970 and 1993. The most important data sources are  a large
number of international and specialized trade and technology journals for each sector of
industry and many fields of technology. These journals cover in particular companies
from North America, Europe and Asia. Companies' annual reports, the Financial Times'
Industrial Companies Yearbooks and Dun and Bradstreet's Who Owns Whom provided
information about dissolved equity ventures and investments, as well as ventures that we
did not register when surveying alliances.   
The database contains information on each cooperative agreement and some
information on companies participating in these agreements. Cooperative agreements are
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defined as the establishment of common interests between independent (industrial)
partners which are not connected through (majority) ownership. The transfer of
technology or the undertaking of joint research is considered as  crucial to these
arrangements.  Examples in this respect are joint research pacts and joint development
agreements. In addition data are collected on joint ventures with technology sharing or
which have a joint R&D program. Mere production or marketing joint ventures are
excluded. R&D oriented joint ventures and jointly-owned research corporations are seen
as joint ventures, joint development agreements, joint research pacts and research
contracts are taken together as contractual agreements.
For the purpose of the present analysis information is used regarding the form of
cooperation, the international or domestic character of the alliance, the size of firms
involved, the sectors and fields of technology and the year of establishment of the
strategic technology alliance. The distribution of firm size is according to employment in
five categories (less than 500, 500 to 5.000, 5.000 to 50.000, 50.000 to 150.000, larger
than 150.000 employees). Within the CATI database there are 65 classifications with
respect to sectors and fields of technology. A major distinction is made between new core
technologies (information technologies, biotechnology, new materials) and other
industrial sectors. Additional information on this data bank can be found in Hagedoorn
(1993) and Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994), or obtained from the authors.
The second data bank provides information on M&As. This data bank is property
of the firm Securities Data and can be used via on-line access. Currently it contains
information on about 125.000 worldwide M&As for the period 1980-1994. This
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information is arranged in several data files. For a limited period of time this data base
has been accessed and a specific data sample has been extracted. The relational form of
the data base facilitates the linking of these data files to each other and also to files in
other data banks. Within the M&As data base there is information on the year the M&A
got established. In addition, it contains company information on the acquirer, the target,
the parent acquirer and the parent target firm. The industry information is provided in SIC
codes of the aquiree and acquirer. Unfortunately, the distinction between a merger or an
acquisition and a takeover as made by Securities Data does not always correspond to the
real background of the M&A. This is partly due to the character of information on M&As
in the trade literature.  For example, a number of cases has been classified as mergers
despite the obvious mismatches in firm-size indicating an acquisition. Acquisitions are
frequently presented as mergers because of the negative publicity that acquisitions receive
in particular if a foreign partner is involved. Also, the official classification and definition
of both modes differs from country to country (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). As M&As
both lead to integration they are taken together and considered as one single category.
For the search procedure that would allow us to find any transition from strategic
technology alliances to M&As we have taken the following steps:
- First, a search procedure was developed that would guarantee that all firms
involved in strategic technology alliances and M&As in both data banks could be
identified. The actual search procedure applied examined the parent companies
involved in strategic technology alliances and M&As. This procedure ensures the
highest level of corporate control for the analysis with all subsidiaries that are part
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of a strategic technology alliance or an M&A being included. This procedure
provided us with a population of strategic technology alliances and M&As made
by a large group of companies using both modes. In other words, if the transition
would take place, it has to show up in this population with firms that are active in
both strategic technology alliances and M&As.
- Second, a correspondence in the data fields concerning industry information in
both data banks had to be made at the industry level. The technology classification
in the CATI data based was adjusted to the SIC code system in the M&As data
base using a correspondence table. As a result, the data on cooperative technology
alliances within the CATI data bank relevant to the analysis amounted to 6425
strategic technology partnerships. The extracted amount of data from the database
on M&As corresponding to the CATI data bank amounted to approximately
16,400 cases. In total about 3000 companies are involved in strategic technology
alliances and M&As during the period under consideration.
- Throughout this paper we will discuss alliances, although technically speaking we
are analyzing dyads or points of contacts between companies through alliances. In
other words, an alliance with more than two partners has several dyads. Also, the
first alliance (dyad) between companies as found in our data bank is taken as a
point of reference; other alliances between the same partners before an M&A is
created (chronologically multiple contacts) are neglected. As such we only analyze
whether companies have been acquainted with each other through an initial
alliance and then established an M&A.
17
- Finally, to examine the probability of a transition from strategic technology
alliances to M&As, the subset of data extracted from the CATI database is used
as the starting point for the analysis. M&As preceding strategic technology
alliances between the same partners are neglected as being illogical. In case of an
identical announcement year for an alliance and  an M&A, we also ignored these
because of the high-risk of a misinterpretation of the announcement.
As discussed above, the population of strategic technology alliances under transition was
examined with respect to different determinants that could affect this transition. The
results of the examination of these different determinants for strategic technology
alliances that are actually transformed into M&As are set against the population of non-
transformed strategic technology alliances, to compare for different patterns. These non-
transformed alliances are the total  number of alliances that could have been transformed
minus those that actually were minus the chronologically, multiple contacts between the
same partners.
The descriptive statistics and simple chi-square tests for differences in the
distributions for both populations provide already some answers to some of the questions
raised and allow us to already test some hypotheses in a bivariate setting. We will apply
logit analysis to test the hypotheses further in a multivariate setting.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Our first finding, and we think also the most remarkable outcome of this research, is that
only 2.6% of  the total number of strategic technology alliances that we studied could be
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linked to M&As. From the total of 6425 strategic technology alliances only 168 cases
were linked to M&As of the same partners. If this transition from strategic technology
partnership to an M&A took place, this happened within an average period of 6.1 years
(with a standard deviation of 4.8). 
Table 1 also presents some size-related characteristics of firms involved with
strategic technology alliances that have led to M&As of partners. About 38% of the firms
involved in this transformation process employ between 5,000 and 50,000 people. The
group of large firms with over 50,000 employees has a share of 33.5% of this particular
group of alliances. Compared to the distribution of the  non-transformed alliances that we
searched in this study the distribution for alliances in transition is more skewed as firms
with over 5,000 employees have a share of 71.5% against about 30% for all alliances. If
we consider the distribution of partners from similar or dissimilar size-categories also
involved in an M&A succeeding a strategic technology alliance, we see that  two-thirds
of these alliances are made between dissimilar companies. For the non-transformed
strategic technology alliances the share of companies from different size-classes is
significantly higher as about 77% of the partnerships are made between dissimilar firms.
A probably more striking result is that of the total number of alliances leading to M&As,
only 17% refer to cases where a large or very large company acquires its smaller partner,
which is nearly half of the share for non-transformed alliances.
---------- insert table 1 about here ----------
19
Data regarding the (inter)national, sectoral and organizational patterns of the
groups of strategic technology alliances leading to M&As and the non-transformed
strategic technology alliances is presented in table 2. Apparently the distribution of
domestic and international alliances comes close to a 45% and 55% distribution for
transformed strategic technology alliances and close to a 40% and 60% distribution for
the non-transformed population. The chi-square test reveals that there is no significant
difference between both distributions. 
For the group of transformed alliances we found that about 42% of them are joint
ventures, in the group of all other strategic technology alliances the share of joint ventures
is about 36%. These findings do not suggest significant differences between both
populations in this respect. 
If we look at the sectoral background of companies participating in these transitory
strategic technology alliances we see that about 73% of them are made by companies
from the same sectors compared to 51% for the overall population of strategic technology
alliances. The chi-square test reveals that there are significant differences between both
distributions. 
As far as the distribution of new core technology alliances and other fields of
partnering is concerned we see some interesting differences. There is a significant
difference between the share for high-tech alliances preceding a take over or merger
(59.5%) and the share for the population at large where 67% of the strategic technology
alliances are made in new core technologies. 
20
 ---------- insert table 2 about here ----------
Given the binary dependent variable, i.e. the occurrence or absence of a
transformation of a strategic technology alliance, and the dichotomous nature of the
independent variables, i.e. the dimensions of a possible transformation process as
discussed above, logit analysis is applied to test the hypotheses in a multivariate setting.
There are 6425 observations, with missing data on 2171 cases  where the size of partners
or the sector could not be identified, see also table 1 and 2. In the remaining sample 153
strategic technology alliances were classified as leading to an M&A, 4101 of them did
not. To examine the propensity of strategic technology alliances to lead to M&As,  the
dependent variable TRANS was introduced (TRANS, transformed alliances = 1, not
transformed alliances = 0). The different characteristics of strategic technology alliances
in the model are SIZE, INT, SECT, CORE and EQUI. The categorical variable SIZE
indicates size differences of firms involved in a strategic technology alliance (SIZE,
unequal size = 1, equal size = 0). The variable INT describes the (inter)national patterns
of these alliances (INT, international = 1, national = 0).  Sectoral and organizational
patterns of these alliances are characterized with the categorical variables SECT, CORE
and EQUI respectively (CORE, new core technology = 1, non-core technology = 0;
SECT, same sector = 1, other sectors =0; EQUI, equity-based = 1, non-equity based = 0).
In order to analyze which characteristics determine the probabilities that strategic
technology alliances lead to M&As, we first applied a simple logit model. The estimation
results of the simple logit model are specified in table 3. It is apparent that the
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significance level of the model is very low (pseudo R  = 0.04).  A closer look at the2
analysis shows that from the 4254 cases, 153 were wrongly classified which all belong
to the group of strategic technology alliances that were transformed to M&As. Another
logit model, constructed to take into account the unbalanced distribution in the sample,
generated similar results with respect to significance levels of model and the different
variables.  In addition, a loglinear analysis of the data did not significantly improve the
results either. 
------------- insert table 3 about here ----------
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our findings indicate that strategic technology partnering plays hardly any direct role
when companies form M&As (hypothesis 1). Only in about 2.6% of the relevant strategic
technology alliances have these alliances led to an M&A between the same partners. This
result is particularly strong as we used two large data sets combining information on over
6000 strategic technology alliances with information on 16,000 M&As of the same group
of over 3000 firms.
Our statistical analysis at the bivariate level seems to provide some understanding
of this transformation process, but these results have to be seen against the background
of the limited relevance that this process apparently has. Concerning the dissimilarity of
size-classes of companies that use strategic technology alliances to acquire their partners
or merge with them, we found little support for an encroachment thesis with large firms
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using their strategic technology alliances to take over their small partners (hypothesis 2b).
The role of large firms in taking over their smaller partners is rather limited as this
happened in 17% of the cases where strategic technology alliances were transformed into
integrated common ownership.
The different variants of logit analysis also demonstrate that the phenomenon of
transformation hardly ever takes place and, moreover, its is shown through the extreme
low value of the coefficient of determination that the relationships mentioned in the
hypotheses have little or no meaning in a multivariate setting. In the few cases where
strategic technology partnering is part of a movement towards M&As, it seems this
pattern defies the logic that one could deduct from scattered pieces of literature on joint
ventures and strategic partnering that point at the relevance of an encroachment strategy.
In other words, although some of the hypotheses seem to be confirmed in a bivariate and
even in a multivariate setting, a completely different set of relationships and variables
seem necessary to explain  the behaviour of companies in the context of both strategic
technology alliances and M&As. 
Before we point at some relevant topics for such an alternative understanding of
the relationship between strategic technology alliances and M&As, it is  important to
stress a possible limitation of this paper. It should be noted that our research pertains to
only one specific group of alliances, i.e. those for which the sharing or joint development
of new technologies and joint undertaking of R&D is part of the alliance. Therefore, our
results could probably have fewer implications for those strategic alliances that are aimed
at joint marketing or the sharing of manufacturing or services. However, in recent years
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a growing number of contributions (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Osborn and
Baughn, 1990; Mowery, 1988; Mytelka, 1991) stress the importance that strategic
alliances with a large technology content play in particular in turbulent high-tech
industries that will shape much of the present and near-future competitive environment.
It is also in these industries that we find a dominance of contractual modes of partnering.
As strategic technology alliances seem to play such a small role in the
encroachment of partners, their relevance for company strategies will have to be found
somewhere else. An increasing part of the recent literature suggests that strategic
technology alliances have to be understood as an important part of a learning process of
companies in which they discover new innovative opportunities in a flexible setting of a
multitude of partnerships (Ciborra, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1995). Such a learning process in
the context of cooperative technological development is of a complicated nature that
resembles high-tech learning (Lyles, 1994), exploratory learning (Dodgson, 1993; March,
1991) or double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) as it covers a change of
routines, unlearning and the discovery of new issues in a joint effort. To some extent the
complexity of this learning is due to partner differences (Parkhe, 1991). However, this
complexity is at least as much influenced by the exploratory nature of learning in
technological development itself, in particular in those industries where technological
change is still of a turbulent nature.
Once this learning process of companies changes towards more standard
information processing and learning and flexibility become less important for large
groups of companies as industries gradually mature, integration through M&As will
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probably become a more viable option (Ciborra, 1991). As long as sectors of industry or
fields of technology can be characterized as turbulent environments with high
technological risk (Ring and van de Ven, 1992) combinations of internal learning and the
timely absorption of new technologies through alliances can be more effective than
takeovers or mergers of (parts of) companies. In other words, for technological renewal
under dynamic-competitive circumstances (Garud, 1994) where knowledge expires
quickly, flexible partnering with capable partners might be more adequate than an
encroachment strategy leading to formal integration. 
A major conclusion from this study appears to be that strategic technology
partnering is a different category on its own. In evaluating the impact of strategic
decisions in the context of integration versus contracting strategies aimed at improving
the innovative capabilities of firms (Teece, 1987) there appears to be little room for
transitional strategies as such. Separate modes of partnering, be it of a contractual or an
equity nature, have different organizational and strategic properties (Hagedoorn, 1993)
but they share their distinctive character that sets them apart from common governance
through integration. In that sense, there exists, as far as strategic technology partnering
is concerned, and with very few exceptions, no real continuum which suggests that
strategic technology partnering is a 'front porch' for corporate growth through integration,
by means of M&As.
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Table 1 Company-size related characteristics of strategic technology alliances
transformed into mergers and acquisitions, %, 1970-1993
Size distribution Companies in transformed Companies in
alliances all other alliances
(n = 189)*  (n = 2848)*1 2
< 500 employees 15.0% 42.5%
500 - 5000 13.3% 27.1%
5000 - 50.000 38.2% 24.4%
50.000 - 150.000 23.7%  4.1%
> 150.000  9.8%  1.8%
Total       100%  100%
Alliances with Transformed alliances All other alliances
companies of: (n = 168)*  (n =6257)*1 2
similar size 34.6% 23.1%
dissimilar size 65.4% 76.9%
- of which dominated
by large firms** 17.0%   33.4%
X =11.4899; p < 0.0007 for distributions of (dis)similar size2
* for 173 of companies with transformed alliances the size could be traced, for all other
companies the size of 1375 companies could be traced, for transformed alliances  the size
of partners could be traced for 153 alliances, for all other alliances the size of partners
could be identified for 4101 cases
**large firm dominance: combinations of firms >150.000 employees with all companies
<50.000 employees; companies with between 50.000 - 150.000 employees with all
companies <5.000 employees
Source: MERIT-CATI and Securities Data - M&A
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Table 2 International and sectoral patterns in strategic technology alliances
transformed into mergers and acquisitions, %, 1970-1993
Transformed alliances All other alliances
 (n  = 168)  (n  = 6257)1 2
Domestic alliances 45.8% 40.5%
International alliances 54.2% 59.5%
Total    100% 100%
Joint ventures 41.7% 36.4%
Contractual alliances 58.3% 63.6%
Total 100% 100%
Identical sectors 72.7% 50.8%
Different sectors 27.3% 49.2%
Total*    100% 100%
Core technologies 59.5% 67.1%
Other sectors 40.5% 32.9%
Total    100% 100%
*the actual numbers for the sectoral distribution of alliances are 154 and 4385
(Inter-)national distribution, X  = 1.9478; p < 0.16282
Joint venture distribution, X  = 2.0072; p < 0.15662
Identical sectors distribution,X  = 29.5995; p < 0.00002
Core technologies distribution,X  = 4.3789; p < 0.03642
Source: MERIT-CATI and Securities Data - M&A
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Table 3 Results of the logit analysis for the relationship between characteristics of
strategic technology alliances and the probability of transformation into
M&As
coef s.e. 
EQUI 0.253    0.169
INT  -0.086       0.172
SECT -1.023*** 0.187
SIZE   -0.459***   0.177
CORE -0.565*** 0.178
Constant -2.252*** 0.226
Observations 4254    
Model 1267.91
likelihood
Pseudo R  0.042
 *** p<0.01 (two tailed test of coefficients, one tailed test of likelihood ratio)
